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Abstract
da Costa and Werning (2005) prove that the Friedman rule of setting nominal interest rate to
zero is locally optimal in a monetary model where each consumer receives a privately
observed skill shock and the government uses incentive compatible non-linear income
taxation. In this paper, we show that when goods and money are strictly separable from labor
in the consumer's utility function, the Friedman rule is the globally optimal monetary policy.
Positive nominal interest rate does not improve social welfare.
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A major goal of monetary policy analysis is to derive the optimal monetary policy rule.
Many authors, including Chari and Kehoe (1998), show that the Friedman rule to set the
nominal interest rate as zero is the optimal policy rule in most of the representative agent
models. However, many details remain to be clari￿ed in a heterogeneous agent model.
Recently da Costa and Werning (2005) (henceforth CW) have developed a monetary
model in which each agent has di⁄erent skill and it is private information. They show
that when the government can use incentive-compatible non-linear income taxation, the
Friedman rule is locally optimal. From their results, Kocherlakota (2005b) and Chari
and Kehoe (2006) argue that if the government have enough ￿scal policy instruments,
monetary authority should follow the Friedman rule.
However, the analysis by CW has one problem. They do not show that the Friedman
rule is globally optimal. CW use the Lagrangian in the welfare maximization problem of
the government. In their proof of the optimality, the sign of the multiplier on the incentive
constraint plays a crucial role. However, they derived it only when the nominal interest
rate i is zero. CW admit that nothing is known on the sign of the multiplier when i is
positive and they just assume that the sign does not change as i increases from zero. 1
Hence their proof is valid only when the nominal interest rate is around zero.
This paper studies the money-in-the-utility-function model in which the disutility
from labor and the utility from consumptions and money holdings are strictly separable.
The paper extends their results and shows that the Friedman rule is globally optimal.
The paper proves that for any incentive-compatible policy with positive nominal interest
rate, there exists an incentive-compatible, feasible and welfare-improving policy with zero
nominal interest rate. Redistributions by expansionary monetary policy do not improve
social welfare if nonlinear taxation is available.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 shows the
optimality of the Friedman rule. Section 4 concludes the paper. All proofs of the lemmas
are in the Appendix.
2. The Model
In this section, we set-up the model and state our assumptions. Our model follows
closely those in CW, Chari and Kehoe (1998), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) and Kocher-
lakota (2005a).
2.1. Preferences
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0;1;2;::: 1: There is a continuum of agents with
measure one. Each agent is identical ex ante and the instantaneous utility function is
u(c;m) ￿ h(l); (1)
1CW describes the problem on the multiplier in page 9.
1where c ￿ 0 is consumption, m ￿ 0 is money in real term and l ￿ 0 is work time. The
disutility h from labor supply and the utility u from consumption and money are strictly
separable. The function u is concave, twice continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing
in c, weakly increasing in m and limc!+0 uc(c;m) = +1. On the other hand, h is strictly
increasing, strictly convex and twice continuously di⁄erentiable.
There exists the satiation level of money ￿(c) which is de￿ned over c ￿ 0 such that
￿(0) = 0, ￿
0 (c) ￿ 0 and ￿(c) > 0 if c > 0. The marginal utility on money satis￿es
um (c;m) > 0 if m < ￿(c);
um (c;m) = 0 if m ￿ ￿(c):
Hence the utility is unchanged when the real money holding exceeds the satiation level.
The ex ante homogeneous agent receives an idiosyncratic shock on her skill at the
beginning of period 0. The shock is described as a parameter ￿, which has the distribution
function F (￿) and the density function f (￿) > 0. The distribution function F has a




with 0 < ￿ < ￿ ￿ < 1. Hence ￿ > 0 for all ￿ 2 ￿.
The skill parameter ￿ is private information to each agent. It is independently dis-
tributed across agents and is ￿xed across time. In what follows we call an agent with
skill ￿ as agent ￿. If agent ￿ supplies labor by l, she produces e⁄ective labor according to
the function y = ￿l. Production uses a linear technology and one unit of e⁄ective labor
produces one unit of single good. E⁄ective labor y is observable, but actual labor l is not
observable to the government.
The preferences of agent ￿ over consumption ct real money balances mt and e⁄ective
labor yt are expressed as (1 ￿ ￿)
P1
t=0 ￿
t fu(ct;mt) ￿ h(yt=￿)g, where ￿ is the discount
factor. Similar preferences are in Werning (2007). Since ￿ > 0, h(yt=￿) is well-de￿ned.
2.2. Agent￿ s problem
This subsection describes the problem of agents. After receiving the skill shock, each
agent reports her skill parameter to the government according to the reporting strategy
￿ (￿) : ￿ ! ￿. We describe the determination of the reporting strategy later.





agent who reports ￿
0 as her skill. Here xt (￿) is income and yt (￿) is e⁄ective labor in period
t ￿ 0.
Let V ￿ (￿
0;￿) denote the value function of agent ￿ with the reporting strategy ￿
0. Given
the allocation, agent ￿ who reports ￿ (￿) as her skill solves
V

























+ xt (￿ (￿)) t ￿ 0; (3)
2and the e⁄ective labor assignment
yt = yt (￿ (￿)); (4)
where Mt+1 is money held between times t and t + 1, pt is the price level, Bt is the real
value of government bond holdings that mature at the beginning of time t, and Rt is the
real rate of return on the bonds. The real money balances mt are written as mt = Mt+1=pt.
Let it = Rt=(pt=pt+1) ￿ 1 denote the nominal interest rate. (Note that pt=pt+1 is the
rate of return on money.) From the arbitrage condition Rt ￿ pt=pt+1, it is nonnegative.
Following Chari and Kehoe (1998), here we assume that the government chooses the
nominal interest rate it as the monetary policy. We impose the initial condition on debt























Using (5), we can consolidate the sequence of budget constraints:
1 X
t=0
qt fct + rtmt ￿ xt (￿ (￿))g ￿ 0; (6)




i if t > 0. In the present value budget
constraint (6), qt is the price of good in period t and rtmt is the opportunity cost of
holding money mt. In what follows, we call rt as the nominal interest rate, instead of it.
For all ￿, the reporting strategy ￿ (￿) is determined by ￿ (￿) 2 argmax￿02￿ V ￿ (￿
0;￿).
The strategy ￿ maximizes each agent￿ s utility given the allocation fxt (￿);yt (￿)g
1
t=0. Ob-
viously the ￿ (￿) depends on the government policy.
2.3. Government Policy
In this subsection we describe ￿scal and monetary policy of the government. First we
de￿ne the policy.
De￿nition 1 Government policy is the allocation fxt (￿);yt (￿);rtg1
t=0 in which fxt (￿);
yt (￿)g is the income￿ labor assignment for an agent who reports ￿ as her type and rt is
the nominal interest rate in period t.
Following CW, we focus on the stationary equilibrium with price qt = ￿
t and the
time-independent policy fx(￿);y (￿);rg
1
t=0. Agent ￿ with the reporting strategy ￿
0 max-








tfct + rmt ￿ x(￿





v (x;r) = max
(c;m):c+rm=x
u(c;m) = u[c(x;r);m(x;r)]; (8)
V (x;y;r;￿) = v (x;r) ￿ h(y=￿): (9)
Here v and V are the indirect utility functions and c(￿) (m(￿)) is the consumption (money)
demand which is a function of income x and the nominal interest rate r. Note that r is
the opportunity cost for holding money. Clearly V is increasing in x and decreasing in r.
If r = 0, money holding is costless and agents are satiated with money. Thus c(x;0) = x
and m(x;0) = ￿(x). If r > 0, on the other hand, agents are not satiated with money and
m(x;r) < ￿(c(x;r)) since the ￿rst order conditions imply um = ruc > 0.
We can see that the value function V ￿ (￿
0;￿) in (2) is simply expressed by the indirect




0);r;￿) in each period as her utility,
V
￿ (￿






0);r;￿)g = V (x(￿
0);y(￿
0);r;￿): (10)
Let us express the incentive compatibility constraint by V . The government policy
fx(￿);y (￿);rg
1
t=0 is incentive-compatible if and only if
V




0;￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿; (11)
If the policy satis￿es (11), each agent follows the truth-telling strategy ￿ (￿) = ￿. It
follows from (10) that the incentive constraint (11) holds if and only if
V (x(￿);y (￿);r;￿) ￿ V (x(￿
0);y(￿
0);r;￿) for all ￿;￿
0 2 ￿: (12)
From the revelation principle, we can concentrate our attentions on incentive-compatible
policies. If a policy fx(￿);y (￿);rg
1
t=0 is incentive-compatible, the value function of agent
￿ is V ￿ (￿;￿) = V (x(￿);y (￿);r;￿).
The government maximizes the expected utility of the ex ante homogeneous agent
E [V ￿ (￿;￿)] by choosing (i) the nominal interest rate (monetary policy) r and (ii) incentive-
compatible and feasible income taxation (￿scal policy). Here we assume the government
expenditure is time-independent constant G > 0 and is given. If the policy is incentive-
compatible, the consumption of agent ￿ in period t is ct = c(x(￿);r) and the resource
constraint becomes Z ￿ ￿
￿
(y(￿) ￿ c(x(￿);r))dF(￿) ￿ G: (13)
The resource constraint is also time-independent. Note that, as argued in Albanesi and
Sleet (2006), we can interpret f (￿) as the ex-post density of agent ￿ from the law of large
numbers. Formally, we de￿ne the problem of the government as follows.











0) ￿ ct ￿ rmt
￿
g, where ￿ is
the multiplier on the budget constraint.
4De￿nition 2 The optimal policy of the government is the incentive-compatible, feasible
and stationary policy fx(￿);y (￿);rg
1







The government policy is incentive-compatible if (12) holds. If the policy is incentive-
compatible, it is feasible if (13) holds.






















Therefore the incentive-compatible policy satis￿es the monotonicity condition x0(￿) ￿ 0
for all ￿ (see Mirrlees (1976)).
3. Global optimality of The Friedman rule
In this section, we show that the Friedman rule is the globally optimal monetary policy.
We prove that for any incentive-compatible and feasible policy Ar = fx(￿);y(￿);rg
1
t=0 with
r > 0, there exists an incentive-compatible, feasible and welfare-improving policy with
zero nominal interest rate. The proof consists of two steps below.
Step 1. Find a zero interest rate policy ￿ A0 so that agents get the same utilities from
￿ A0 and Ar, but ￿ A0 uses less resources than Ar.
Step 2. Construct a new zero interest rate policy A￿
0 from ￿ A0 by redistributing the
extra resources generated at Step 1 so that every agent increase her utility.
3.1 Resource-saving government policy
In this subsection, we ￿rst construct an incentive-compatible and feasible policy ￿ A0
in which the nominal interest rate is zero and all agents achieve the same utility as
Ar = fx(￿);y(￿);rg
1
t=0. Then we show that it is resource-saving compared with the
original policy Ar.
First, using the indirect utility function v in (8), we let ￿ x(￿) be such that
v (￿ x(￿);0) = v(x(￿);r): (14)
Equation (14) states that the utility (from consumption and money) when labor income
is x(￿) and the nominal interest rate is r and the utility when income is ￿ x(￿) and the
interest rate is zero are the same. Using ￿ x(￿), we let ￿ A0 = f￿ x(￿);y(￿);0g
1
t=0 denote a new
policy with the Friedman rule. The following lemma shows that ￿ A0 is well-de￿ned.
Lemma 1 For all ￿, ￿ x(￿) always exists.
5Equation (14) means that, for all ￿ and ￿





0)=￿) = V (x(￿
0);y(￿
0);r;￿); (15)
Equation (15) states that, regardless of the reporting strategy, each agent gets the same
utility from Ar and ￿ A0. Note that the e⁄ective labor y(￿
0) is the same in Ar and ￿ A0.
Substituting (15) into the incentive constraint (12) yields
V (￿ x(￿);y (￿);0;￿) ￿ V (￿ x(￿
0);y(￿
0);0;￿) for all ￿ and ￿
0: (16)
Hence ￿ A0 is incentive-compatible. The following lemma shows that agents consume less
under ￿ A0 than under Ar. In other words, ￿ A0 uses less resources than Ar.
Lemma 2 Suppose r > 0. The new income level ￿ x(￿) satis￿es
c(x(￿);r) ￿ c(￿ x(￿);0) = ￿ x(￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿; (17)
where c(￿) is the consumption demand function. The strict inequality holds if x(￿) > 0.
The proof of the lemma works as follows. Equation (15) states that each agent achieves
the same utility level from two policies ￿ A0 and Ar. Since she is bene￿ted by the monetary
satiation in ￿ A0, the satiation saves consumption.
The consumption reduction by agent ￿ is equal to c(x(￿);r) ￿ ￿ x(￿). Hence the total




fc(x(￿);r) ￿ ￿ x(￿)gdF(￿): (18)
Lemma 2 implies K ￿ 0. The next lemma shows that Ar is not the optimal if all
agents receive zero income.
Lemma 3 A policy Ar = fx(￿);y(￿);rg
1
t=0 such that r > 0 and x(￿) = 0 for all ￿ is not
the optimal. There is a welfare-improving policy with r = 0.
Now we can limit our attention to a case where x(￿) > 0 for some ￿. From the
monotonicity condition x0(￿) ￿ 0, there exists ￿ 2 [￿;￿ ￿) such that x(￿) > 0 for all ￿ ￿ ￿.
It follows from (17) and (18) that K ￿
R ￿ ￿
￿ fc(x(￿);r) ￿ ￿ x(￿)gdF(￿) > 0. Hence K > 0.
3.2 Reallocation of the extra resources
This subsection shows that we can reallocate the extra resources K > 0 without
violating the incentive constraint and that the reallocation increases the social welfare.
Given the policy ￿ A0 and a constant ￿v > 0, de￿ne w(￿;￿v) by a unique solution of
￿v = v (￿ x(￿) + w;0) ￿ v (￿ x(￿);0); ￿ 2 ￿: (19)
6where ￿ x(￿) is de￿ned in (14). Equation (19) states that if the current government policy
is ￿ A0 and agent ￿ receives an additional income w(￿;￿v), her utility increases by ￿v.
Clearly w(￿;￿) is positive, increasing, continuous and w(￿;0) = 0. Hence for su¢ ciently




￿)dF(￿) ￿ K: (20)
Equation (20) states that if the government increase the income of agent ￿ by w(￿;￿v￿),
the policy changes does not use up the extra resources K.







￿ (￿) = ￿ x(￿) + w(￿;￿v
￿): (21)
Let us compare A￿
0 with ￿ A0. Agent ￿ gets additional income w(￿;￿v￿) in A￿
0, but the
e⁄ective labor assignment y (￿) is the same. Hence every agent increases her utility by
￿v￿ under A￿
0 as long as she adopts the truth telling strategy. The next lemma shows
that this seemingly better policy is actually incentive-compatible and feasible.
Lemma 4 The policy A￿
0 = fx￿ (￿);y(￿);0g
1
t=0 is incentive-compatible and feasible.
Since the extra income w(￿;￿v￿) raises the utility of agent ￿ by ￿v￿, her utility from
the policy A￿
0 is written as
V (x
￿ (￿);y (￿);0;￿) = v (x
￿ (￿);0) ￿ h(y (￿)=￿) (22)
= ￿v
￿ + v (￿ x(￿);0) ￿ h(y (￿)=￿):
Substituting (14) into (22) yields
V (x
￿ (￿);y (￿);0;￿) = ￿v
￿ + V (x(￿);y (￿);r;￿): (23)
Equation (23) states that if we compare the new policy A￿
0 = fx￿ (￿);y(￿);0g
1
t=0 with the
original positive nominal interest policy Ar = fx(￿);y(￿);rg
1
t=0, A￿
0 gives the additional
utility to each agent. Finally we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The Friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy.
Proof. Since every agent raises her utility by ￿v￿ under A￿
0, the social welfare also
increases by ￿v￿. Therefore, the positive nominal interest rate policy Ar cannot be
socially optimal. Thus the optimal nominal interest rate is zero.
4. Conclusion
This paper considers the money-in-the-utlity-function model in which agents are het-
erogeneous in their skills and the government can use nonlinear income taxation. It shows
that the Friedman rule maximizes social welfare when the disutility from labor and the
utility from consumptions are strictly separable. The model described here could lead to
a better understanding of monetary policy analysis in a heterogeneous agent model.
7APPENDIX A: Proof of Lemma 1
If x(￿) = 0 for all ￿, e⁄ective labor y(￿) is also the same across agents. Otherwise
the policy violates the incentive compatibility. Hence for some constant y ￿ 0, y(￿) = y.
From feasibility, y ￿ G > 0. Note that if the income is zero, nominal interest rate does




















Now consider a new policy A0
0 = f￿x;y + ￿x;0g
1
t=0 with labor income ￿x > 0. Under
A0
0, each agent receive positive income ￿x, but they have to work more than under Ar.
Since the policy is type-independent, A0
0 is incentive-compatible. It is also feasible because
Z ￿ ￿
￿
f(y + ￿x) ￿ c(￿x;0)gdF(￿) =
Z ￿ ￿
￿
(y + ￿x ￿ ￿x)dF(￿) = y ￿ G:
Let us show that for a small ￿x > 0, A0
0 is welfare-improving. Since limc!0 uc(c;m) =
+1, limx!0 @v(x;0)=@x = limc!0 du(c;￿(c))=dc = +1. If r = 0, the marginal utility
of the indirect utility function v goes to +1 as labor income approaches to zero. Hence








































Hence Ar is not the optimal policy. ￿
APPENDIX B: Proof of Lemma 2
First suppose x(￿) > 0. The function v (x;0) is continuous in x and v (0;0) <
v(x(￿);r) < v(x(￿);0). Hence there exists ￿ x such that v (￿ x;0) = v(x(￿);r). Next, if
x(￿) = 0, then obviously ￿ x(￿) = 0. ￿
8APPENDIX C: Proof of Lemma 3
First suppose x(￿) > 0. If r > 0, monetary satiation does not occur and m(x(￿);r) <
￿(c(x(￿);r)). Hence
v(￿ x(￿);0) = v(x(￿);r)
= u[c(x(￿);r);m(x(￿);r)]
< u[c(x(￿);r);￿(c(x(￿);r))] = v (c(x(￿);r);0):
Since v (￿;0) is the increasing function, ￿ x(￿) < c(x(￿);r).
On the other hand, if x(￿) = 0, clearly c(x(￿);r) = ￿ x(￿) = 0. ￿
APPENDIX D: Proof of Lemma 4
The proof consists of two parts, incentive compatibility and feasibility.











￿ + v (￿ x(￿);0) ￿ h(y(￿)=￿)
= V (x
￿(￿);y(￿);0;￿),
for all ￿ and ￿
0. Thus A￿
0 = fx￿ (￿);y(￿);0g
1
t=0 is also incentive-compatible.




￿)dF(￿) ￿ K =
Z ￿ ￿
￿
fc(x(￿);r) ￿ ￿ x(￿)gdF(￿): (25)








Hence Z ￿ ￿
￿




y (￿) ￿ c(x(￿);r)dF(￿) ￿ G:
Therefore the policy A￿
0 does not violate the resource constraint. ￿
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